Relic of the Cold War: The Case for Canceling the Sentinel ICBM Program
The Sentinel ICBM project, a program with an initial budgetary estimate of $100 billion, has now spiraled to $140 billion with no operational missiles to show for it. The effort, intended to replace the Minuteman III, has faced continuous delays and cost overruns, making it the latest in a long line of defense programs that consume vast resources while producing little in return. If the goal is deterrence, not use, then the United States should rethink its reliance on land-based ICBMs altogether.
The nuclear triad was conceived in a different era, designed to counter the Soviet Union at a time when intercontinental nuclear war seemed not just plausible but likely. Times have changed, and so should our approach to nuclear deterrence. The most survivable and effective component of America’s nuclear arsenal has always been its submarine-launched ballistic missiles. A fleet of Ohio-class and soon-to-be Columbia-class submarines provide an undetectable, always-ready second-strike capability that renders any rational first-strike attempt against the U.S. suicidal.
Land-based ICBMs, in contrast, offer little that submarines and strategic bombers do not already provide. Their main function, beyond carrying warheads, is to serve as a "nuclear sponge"—a set of targets meant to absorb enemy strikes. But as an expensive and unnecessary component of nuclear deterrence, ICBMs invite the very scenarios they are meant to prevent. Their fixed locations make them vulnerable to preemptive attack, and their rapid-launch capability creates a dangerous "use it or lose it" scenario that heightens the risk of accidental or mistaken nuclear war.
The Minuteman III missiles, last refurbished in 2015, have been evaluated by military analysts and determined to be extendable through at least 2050 with a relatively modest investment of $10 billion—an order of magnitude lower than the estimated $500 billion total cost of the Sentinel program. The logic is simple: if deterrence depends on the perception of capability rather than actual use, then the age of the system is immaterial. An adversary contemplating a nuclear strike will still have to consider the threat posed by the Minuteman III fleet, regardless of whether its electronics are cutting-edge or merely sufficient.
By canceling the Sentinel program, the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) can save at least $360 billion—funds that could be better spent on more survivable and technologically advanced alternatives. Nuclear-armed submarines remain the most reliable leg of the triad. If there is any strategic value in enhancing deterrence, expanding the Navy’s Columbia-class program or investing in next-generation unmanned, nuclear-armed underwater platforms would be far more effective. The future of warfare is autonomous, stealth-driven, and flexible. The Sentinel program is none of those things.
Some will argue that without Sentinel, the U.S. would fall behind Russia and China in the nuclear arms race. But this assumes that parity is measured in missile count rather than survivability and effectiveness. The Russian Federation maintains a vast ICBM arsenal, but it has also inherited an aging infrastructure and faces its own economic constraints. China is expanding its ICBM force, but the real shift in deterrence strategy has come from its growing fleet of nuclear-armed submarines. Even among America’s chief adversaries, the writing is on the wall: land-based ICBMs are an outdated strategy, and maritime nuclear deterrence is the future.
Beyond strategic considerations, there is the fundamental question of cost-effectiveness. The Sentinel program represents the worst of government inefficiency: a ballooning budget, endless delays, and an unclear timeline for actual deployment. The latest Pentagon assessments indicate that Sentinel will not be fully operational until well into the 2030s—by which time the technology will likely already be outdated. The Air Force itself has admitted that the infrastructure modernization required to deploy Sentinel was severely underestimated, leading to a reevaluation of the project’s total costs. The reality is stark: Sentinel is a money pit, and continuing to throw resources at it is a prime example of good money chasing bad.
Some policymakers will argue that abandoning Sentinel would send the wrong message to America’s allies and adversaries alike. But the message sent by pouring hundreds of billions into a failing program is worse. It signals to adversaries that the U.S. is willing to spend recklessly on outdated platforms rather than investing in next-generation defense capabilities. It signals to allies that America prioritizes inertia over innovation, wasting resources that could otherwise strengthen broader strategic deterrence.
The United States should recognize that the era of land-based nuclear missiles is coming to an end. Sentinel is an unnecessary and exorbitantly expensive relic of Cold War thinking. Rather than pursuing a system that is already obsolete before its completion, the U.S. should modernize its existing Minuteman III fleet at a fraction of the cost, while shifting resources toward more survivable and flexible nuclear platforms. This is not a call for nuclear disarmament but for smarter nuclear deterrence. If the goal is true security rather than maintaining bureaucratic inertia, then the Sentinel program must be canceled.
The next war, should it come, will not be fought with silo-based missiles waiting to be incinerated in a first strike. It will be fought in the shadows of the ocean depths, with silent submarines ensuring that no adversary can launch an attack without facing certain and overwhelming retaliation. The U.S. should embrace this reality and allocate its resources accordingly. Sentinel is not the future. It is an expensive monument to the past, and it should be abandoned before another wasted dollar is spent.
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